3©iift(£rM^'. 


REP^OPtT 


FROM    THE 


JOINT    SELECT   COMMITTEE, 

To  investigate  the  management  of  the  Navy  Department. 


The  Joint  Select  Committee  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Represent- 
atives, "  appointed  to  investigate  the  administration  of  the  Navy 
Department,  under  its  present  head,  with  power  to  send  for  persons 
and  papers,  and  to  report  the  result  of  said  investigation  to  the  tw(t 
Houses,  respectively,"  ask  leave  to  rep^rt: 

That,  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  the  resolution 
for  their  appointment,  they  huve  called  before  them  many  persons  en- 
gaged in  the  naval  and  military  service,  as  contractors  and  em- 
ployees, as  well  as  others  in  civil  life,  supposed  to  have  knowledge  of 
the  matters  to  be  inveitigated,  and  have  examined  many  papers  among 
the  archives  of  the  Navy  Department,  in  order  to  inform  themselves 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  department  has  hern  administered.  They 
have  sought  information  wherever  they  supposed  it  could  be  found, 
and  have  invited  it  from  all  who  could  give  ir.  The  largo  number  of 
witmesses  and  voluminous  records  examined,  proiractoi  their  sittings 
until  near  ihe  close  cf  the  last  session  of  Congress,  when  they  found 
it  necessary  to  print  the  testimony,  that  each  meuiber  might  review  it 
before  making  a  report,  and  that  the  two  Houses  vnight  he  enable;!  to 
decide  whether  the  committee  had  formed  a  ju-^t  judgment,  and  at- 
tained a  proper  conclusion.  All  the  testimony  deemed  material  and 
proper  to  be  published  v.ill  be  found  in  a  volume  of  nearly  five  hun- 
dred pages,  printed  during  the  last  recess  of  Congress,  which  they 
herewitli  submit  as  part  of  this  report.  The  various  laws  relating  to 
the  navy,  the  reports  of  the  Secretary,  (which  have  been  confiden- 
tially communicated  to  Congress.)  and  the  rules  and  orders  given  by 
him,  although  coming  under  the  review  of  the  committee,  they  did 
not  think  it  necessary  "r  proper  to  j)rint. 

The  committee  confined  their  examination  to  the  doniestic  operations 
of  the  Navy  Department.  They  intended  to  investigate  its  foreign 
operations  also,  and  enquire  who  were  sent  as  agents  ro  foreign  coun- 


t;  -   wcic   ^ivi'U  liu'ui.   >siiat 

li  hoy  encountered,  and  wliat 

V  .  '  Hut  the  Secretary  and 

r  .  tiic  public  interest  and  the 

;:  '0  furniah  such  information,  as  its  pub- 

'  f»ur  Pcrv;-    - '  "     d,  arrest  their  labors, 

us:  an  iniltee.  concurring  in 

>.     U  16  due,  in  this  cr>nnec- 

Novy  offered  to  send  before 

who  had  charge  of  the  foreign  contracts, 

..v<    relating  to  tliem,  who  could  inform  us. 

r  character  and  resulti*,  and  that  he  oflerod  all 

'         '      •        'icility  for  obtaining  it  he 

r  I  ;  -;   of  the  navy,   whenever 

r:ili«  nu  cuminille«*. 

^'  ir  in   the  printed  testimony,  herewith  submitted,  that 

have  in«|uire<l  into  everything  relating  to  the  materials 
.1111       '  ■    ns  of  the  navy  within  the  Confederate  States ;  the 

mfntT^  ru.  r'fl  for  building  a  navy  ;  the  eftorts  to  purchase  or 

^•  ':;ince  and  ordnanre  stores  ;  the  number 

av  ;  :   or  built,  of  whom  purchased  or  by 

whom  buiif,  the  contracts  for  them  and  how  complied  with  ;  the  con- 
tracts for  war  vessels  now  pending ;  the  vessels  owned  by  the 
Government  when  the  Navy  Department  was  organized,  and  the  num- 
b'  .         .  ^^^^^.  ^^^.j^j,,j  y^y  jj.  ji^p  naval  defences  of  the  Mississippi 

vi  dally  of  New  Orleans,  of  the   Cumberland,  Tennessee 

and  J:im<s   rivers,  an<l  of  the  city   of   Norfolk  ;    the  circumstances 
'•  '  i  with  the  dcistruction  of  the  A'^irginia,  the  Louisiana,  the 
i,  the   Arkansas,  and   other  gunboats;  the  causes  of  our 
1'  isters  and  of    the  failure  of  our  navy  to  meet  the  public 

(  lis. 

TIh-  iiHuuiittee  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  review  all  the  facts 
K'l  iiii.g  to  these  topics  or  to  express  their  conclusion   upon   each  of 
as  the  testimony  is  herewith  presented  and  may  bo  read   by  all 
u'sire  the  information  it  furnishes.     They   think   they   wilt  dis- 
(.•  their  duty  by  expressing  the  general  result  of  their  inve^tiga- 
liwii:..     They  arc  gratified  that  they  can  state  that,  after  long,  patient 
and  careful  investigation,  they  have  found  nothing  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the   Navy    Department  that  justifies   any   censure  of   Mr. 
Mallory. 

Mr  Mallory  assumed  the  oftico  of  Secretary  of  the  Nrvy  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Provisional  Ciovernment  and  organized  its  Navy 
Department,  It  then  had  no  navy,  no  vessels  of  war,  and,  indeed, 
not  a  vessel  of  any  kind.  There  were  but  two  navy  yards  in  the 
(Confederate  States,  and  but  little  ship  timber  in  them.  We  had  but 
a  small  number  of  ship-wrights  or  of  persons  possessing  the  skill  or 
handicraft  necessary  to  the  construction  of  vessels  of  war.  We  had 
but  few  seamen,  and  no  commercial  school  for  training  seamen.  We 
were  especially  deficient  in  the  machinery  for  propelling  steam  ves- 
sels and  in  tlie  means  for  its  construction.     We  had  not  the  iron,  the 


\ 


P 

iron  works,  tlie  foundries  or  rolling-mill>;,  the  work  shops  or  the  ^^^ 
skilled  workmen,  essential  to  the  completion  of  formidable  ships  of 
war.  But  seven  steam  war  vessels  had  been  built  in  the  States  now 
forming  the  Confederac J  since  the  war  of  1812.  Engines  for  but 
two  of  these  were  contracted  for  in  these  States,  the  lieavy  forgings 
of  which  were  necessarily  contracted  for  elsewhere.  The  entire  raa- 
chinerv  for  such  vessels  had  not  been  constructed  in  these  States. 
Our  means  and  resources  for  building  a  navy  were  so  small  and 
inconsiderable  compared  with  the  naval  power  and  resources  of  the 
enemy,  that  many  patriotic  men  doubted  the  wisdom  of  an  attempt  to 
construct  a  navy. 

While  our  moans  of  building  huUh.,  engines  and  machinery,  and  of 
equipping  and  manning  efficient  sh'ps  of  war  were  thus  limited,  the 
immediate  and  hourly  demands  upon  all  the  workshops  of  the  country 
for  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  reduced  them  still  more.  Thus  the 
shops  at  Norfolk  navy-yard,  after  they  came  under  the  control  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  were  largely*  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of 
gun-carriages,  shot,  shell,  kc,  for  the  army,  and  in  mounting  and 
supplying  guns. 

We  have  had  to  labor  under  the  most  untoward  and  embarrassing 
circumstances.  Men  have  been  employed  as  ship-wrights  who  had 
never  served  an  apprenticeship,  or  budt  a  vessel,  or  even  worked  on 
one,  because  skill  and  experience  could  not  be  commanded.  All 
the  labor  and  materials  requisite  to  complete  and  equip  a  ..  ar  vessel, 
could  not  be  commanded  at  any  one  point  of  the  Confederacy ;  but 
the  machinery  propelling  it,  or  some  part  of  it,  or  the  ordnance  or 
ordnance  stores,  had  to  be  transported  to  the  various  and  distant 
points,  where  the  hulls  were  being  built.  Thus  in  the  construction 
of  the  Mississippi  at  New  Orleans,  the  labor,  skill  and  resources  of 
different  parts  of  the  Confederacy  were  necessarily  invoked;  her  iron 
was  rolled  at  Atlanta,  portions  of  her  machinery  and  equipments  were 
made  at  Norfolk,  whi!e  the  mam  shaft  and  ordnance  and  ordnance 
stores  were  made  at  Richmond. 

In  order  to  sheath  the  hulls  of  gun-boats,  we  ha\e  been  obliged  to 
use  such  scrap  iron,  old  and  rejected  sugar  mills,  and  other  discarded 
iron  as  could  he  gathered  up  ;  and,  to  propel  them  have  been  con- 
strained to  use  the  engines  and  boilers  of  dilapidated  steamboats. 
Hence  it  has  happened  that  some  of  our  gun-boat«  have  proven  inef- 
ficient, because  of  the  imperfection  of  their  machinery  and  sheathing. 

Besides  the  deficiencies  and  difliculties,  we  have  been  obstructed  in 
our  operations  by  the  invasions  of  the  enemy,  whereby  we  not  only 
lost  our  navy  yards,  and  much  of  their  machinery  and  ship  timber, 
but  were  compelled  to  destroy  gun-boats  quite  completed,  and  steam- 
boats whose  machinery  might  have  served  us,  to  prevent  them  frofli 
being  captured  by  the  enemy.  Hence  the  destruction  of  the  Vir- 
ginia. Louisiana,  Mississippi,*  fthe  vessels  in  Lake  Tonchartrain, 
Bayou  St.  John,  the  Yazoo  and  Mississippi  rivers,  and  elsewhere.) 

l3ut,  had  we  been  able  to    command  all  the  worshops  and  material, 

*  Note. — Some  of  the  committee  think  the  lilissisaippi  was  lost  by  want  of  energy  and 
Jiligence  of  officer*  of  the  navy  at  New  Orleans. 


the  arii/ans  and  seamen,  requisite  to  construct  a  navy  equal  in  size  to 
that  of  our  enemy,  still  we  should  have  begun  the  war  upon  the  most 
unequal  terms.  The  enemy  had  a  powerful  navy  to  begin  with  ;  we 
had  none.  Under  the  United  States  Government  the  southern  States 
had  mad(^  great  and  generous  sacrifices  to  promote  the  maratime  in- 
terest of  the  North,  while  the  great  resources  of  naval  wealth  and 
power  Vy-ere  ignored  ;  and  when  we  entered  upon  our  struggle  for  in- 
dependence, we  found  ourselves  confronted,  and  our  waters  invaded 
by  a  powerful  navy,  which  had,  with  our  aid,  been  fostered  and  de- 
•velcped  for  over  sixty  years,  and  which,  in  addition  to  smaller  vessels, 
readily  converted  to  war  uses,  from  a  great  commercial  marine,  com- 
prised thirty-s?ven  steamships,  many  of  them  the  most  formidable  on  the 
ocean,  and  thirty-seven  sailing  vessels,  with  an  aggregate  of  two  thou- 
sand one  hundred  seventy-eight  heavy  guns,  all  under  the  guidance 
of  nava}  men  and  seamen  v/hose  professional  attainments  and  nautical 
skill  were  unsurpassed.  The  enemy's  vast  naval  resources,  great 
commercial  school  for  seamen,  numerous  artizans  and  vast  workshops 
enabled  him  to  augment  thisformible  force  with  a  rapidity  unequalled 
in  naval  history',  while  the  naval  resources  of  the  world  were  also 
opened  to  him.  It  would  hive  required  many  years,  even  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances,  for  us  to  have  built  and  equipped  as 
many  and  such  vessels  as  the  enemy  began  the  war  with. 

The  committee  make  these  observations  merely  in  justice  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  but  to  correct  the  public  judgment,  which 
has  been  founded,  at  least  in  part,  upon  an  exaggerated  estimation  of 
our  means,  or  undeserved  diaestimation  or  of  the  Secretary  or  of  naval 
officers  or  of  contractors  with  the  department.  The  testimony  does 
not  furnish  any  sufficient  grounds  for  imputing,  the  short-comings, 
failures  and  disasters  of  our  navy  to  the  Secretary.  On  the  contrary, 
it  shows  that  he  has  been  vigilant,  industrious  and  energetic,  in  era- 
])loying  the  means  within  his  power  to  purchase  and  to  build  a  navy. 
One  of  hi.^  first  acts,  after  entering  upon  his  duties,  was  to  call  the 
attention  of  Congress. to  the  rapid  and  radical  changes  in  naval  war- 
fare which  had  taken  place  within  a  few  years,  in  displacing  the 
**  wooden  walls"  that  had  been  lelied  on  for  attack  or  defence,  with 
gigantic  iron-clads  He  early  took  means  for  constructing  an  iron- 
clad navy.  An  officer  was  sent  throughout  the  Confederate  States  to 
examine  and  report, the  means  of  manufacturing  and  preparing  iron 
armor  and  heavy  machinery.  Others  were  sent  to  the  United  States, 
to  Canadrf  and  Europe,  to  purchase  or  build  suitable  vessels  for  imme- 
diate use.  The  building  of  armored  vessels  was  begun  in  the  hope 
of  compensating,  by  their  individual  strength,  for  ©ur  great  infe- 
riority to  the  enemy  in  the  number  of  war  vessels,  and  of  seamen 
and  marines.  The  time,  labor  and  material  necessary  1o  construct  a 
single  heavy  armored  vessel  may  be  judged  of  from  the  following  ex- 
ample. The  Merrimac,  one  of  the  ships  sunk  and  partially  de- 
stroyed by  the  enemy  on  abandoning  Norfolk,  was  raised,  and  al- 
though the  main  part  of  the  hull  and  the  boilers  and  material  parts  of 
the  machinery  were  uninjured,  eight  months  of  uninterrupted  labor 
of  as   many   workmen   as   could   be    advantageously    be   employed, 


aided  by  the  workshops  of  Richmond,  were  necessary  to  get 
her  in  fitting  condition  as  an  iron -chid.  Work  upon  her,  nnder 
orders  of  the  navy  department,  was  commenced  on  the  11th  of 
July,  1861,  and  she  foui^ht  the  memorable  battle  of  Hampton  Roads — 
a  battle  which  at  once  revolutiouizeil  naval  warfare — on  the  18th  of 
March  of  1862,  before  she  was  entirely  completed.  And  yet  Con- 
structor Porter  says  :  '*  The  yard  at  Norfolk  was  woti^ed  up  to  its 
fullest  capacity.  Everything  was  properly  organ 'zd,  and  the  oncers 
were  constantly  on  the  spot  directing  ope.ati  mm  «nd  [lUshing  forward 
the  work.  The  Secretar)  of  the  Nav\ ,  in  o'der  to  stimulate  ojteration^, 
offered  inducements,  by  way  of  additionjil  piy  or  rv.*w.irds  to  wriic  arter 
dark  and  on  Sundays.  In  short. .he  offeii'd  <'»ery  encourngeraen  that 
was  calculated  to  excite  them  to  more  zeal  .iud  energy.  Bv  letters  and 
by  telegrams  he  urge<l  the  officers  of  the  navy  at  New  Orleans  and 
other  important  points  to  spare  neither  men  nor  money,  and  r,o  work 
day  and  night  in  completing  gunboats,  preparing  ordnance  stores,  and 
getting  ready  to  attack  or  to  meet  the  enemy.  The  credit  of  the  Navy 
Department,  at  New  Orleans,  was  impaired  for  a  short  time  for  the  want 
of  money  to  pay  the  employees  ;  but  this  is  not  imputable  to  Mr.  Mallory. 
His  requisitions  were  made  upon  the  treasury  in  due  time  to  have  sup- 
plied all  just  demands  against  the  department.  The  causes  of  this 
financial  embrassment  are  explained  in  the  correspondence  between 
himself  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  which  is  embodied  in  the 
testimony.  It  does  not  appear  by  the  testiqiony  that  work  on  any  vessel, 
or  for  the  navy,  at  any  time  or  place,  was  delayed  or  suspended  by 
the  default  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  He  has  ordered  courts  of 
inquiry  in  every  instance  where  there  was  probable  cause  for  attribut- 
ing our  defeat  or  disaster  to  the  deficiency  or  delinquency  of  an  officer 
of  the  navy.  He  has  invited  contracts  for  building  gunboats  wherever 
they  could  be  soonest  and  best  built,  and  most  advantageously  employed. 
His  contracts  seems  to  have  been  judicious,  and  to  have  been  properly 
enforced.  Contractors  have,  in  some  cases,  failed  to  complete  their 
work  within  the  time  stipulated,  whereby  tue  expectations  of  the  Sec- 
retary have  been  disappointed  and  his  plans  defeated.  But,  on  inquiry, 
it  has  been  shown  that  they  failed  to  comply  with  their  engagements 
in  consequence  of  unforeseen  causes  beyond  their  control,  and  not 
through  any  infidelity  or  want  of  diligence 

Inasmuch  as  there  has  been  much  misrepresentation  and  crimiiia- 
tion  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  of  the  Messrs.  Tift,  because 
of  their  failure  to  complete  and  to  save  the  Mississippi,  it  is  but 
sheer  justice  to  say,  that  these  gentlemen  are  not  related  by  blood  or 
marriage,  in  any  degree,  to  Mr.  Mallory  ;  that  they  undertook  to  con- 
struct their  vesj'el  without  pecuniary  reward,  and  prosecuted  the  work 
on  it  with  rare  industry  and  energy  and  with  extraordinary  dispatch; 
that  their  loyalty,  patriotism  and  integrity,  are  unquestionable;  and 
that  neither  they  nor  the  Secretary  are  censurable  for  the  incomplete- 
ness of  that  vessel  when  the  enemy  reached  New  Orleans,  or  for  its 
destruction. 

Their  operations  were  delayed  from  a  want  of  iron  which  the  Navy 
Department  could  not  possibly  supply  as  fast  as  it  was  demanded.    In 


deed,  neither  the  Government  nor  the  people  of  the  Confederacy  have 
been  able  to  meet  and  satisfy  the  great  demands  of  the  army  and  navv 
for  iron.  The  Navy  Department  has,  for  a  long  time  past,  employed 
agents  in  many  parts  of  the  count.iy,  to  gather  scrap  iron  in  cities 
and  on  plantations,  to  relieve,  in  some  measure,  its  necessities. 

The  reports  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  have  not  been  published, 
from  motives'*  of  sound  policy,  and  hence  the  operations  of  that 
department  are  not  generally  known.  It  is  not  dee  ued  proper  now 
to  publish  all  the  facts  which  should  be  presented  in  order  to  a  full 
knowledge  and  just  appreciation  of  the  management  of  the  Navy 
Department.  But  it  is  not  improper  to  state,  that  the  departmeni;. 
has  elected  a  powder  mill,  which  supplies  all  the  powder  required  by 
our  navy ;  two  engine  boilers  and  machine  shops,  and  fine  ordnance 
work  shops.  It  has  established  eighteen  yards  for  building  war 
vessels,  and  a  rope-w;ilk,  making  all  cordage,  from  a  rope  yarn 
to  a  nine  inch  cable,  and  capable  of  turning  out  eight  thousand  per 
month. 

Of  vessels  not  iron  clad,  the  department  has  purchased  and  other- 
wise acquired  and  converted  to  war  vessels,  44. 

Has  built  and  completed  as  war  vessels,  12. 

Has  partially  constructed  and  destroyed  to  save  from  the  enemy, 
10. 

And  has  now  under  construction,  0. 

Of  iron-clad  vessels,  it  has  completed  and  has  now  in  commission, 
14. 

Has  completed  and  destroyed,  or  lost  by  capture,  4. 

Has  in  progress  of  construction  and  in  various  stages  of  forward- 
ness, 20. 

It  has,  also,  one  iron-clad  floating  battery  presented  to  the  Confed- 
erate States  by  the  ladies  of  Georgia ;  and  one  iron-clad  ram  par- 
tially completed  and  turned  over  to  the  Confederacy  by  the  State  of 
Alabama. 

Taking  into  consideration  the  poverty  of  our  means  and  the  formi- 
dable naval  power  and  boundless  resources  of  our  enemy  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  war,  our  people  have  no  sufficient  cause  for  shame  or 
discouragement  in  the  operations  of  our  navy.  What  ha?  been  and 
is  being  done  to  resist  the  enemy  on  the  waters  of  our  rivers  and  on 
the  sea,  should  inspive  confidence  and  excite  strong  hope  that  our  navy 
will  yet  prove  an  efficient  and  worthy  ally  of  our  noble  artnies  in 
achieving  our  independence.  It  has  already  won  the  admiration 
and  applause  of  neutial  nations  for  its  gallant  and  glorious  achieve- 
ments. And  if  we  should  succeed  in  getting  into  service  the  war 
vessels  completed  and  in  progress  of  construction,  the  committee 
believe  that  our  naval  triumphs  will  yet  rival  the  heroic  and  brilliant 
achievements  of  our  land  forces. 

Since  the  last  session  of  Congress,  tme  of  the  members  of  this  com- 
mittee on  the  part  of  the  Senate,  the  Hon.  R.  L.  Y.  Peyton,  has  died; 
and,  as  the  testimony  had  been  taken  before  his  death,  it  was  not 
deemed  necessary  or  proper  to  ask  the  appointment  of  another  Senator 


to  till  his  place.     This  will  explain  why  this  report  is  signed  by  only 

four  Senators. 

E.  BARKSDALE, 
JAMES  LYONS. 

Reserving  my  jutlgment  upon  mucli  of  the  general  course  of 
reasoning  adopted  in  the  report,  I  desire  to  express  my  full  concur- 
rence in  the  conclusion  arrived  at  favorable  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navv. 

WM.  W.  BOYCE, 

On  the  part  of  the  House. 

C.    C.    CLAY,  JR..  CfMirmmi, 
THOS.  J.   SEMMES, 
A.  E.  MAXWELL, 
JAMES  PIIELAN. 


